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RECENT DECISIONS
DECEDENT ESTATE LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT-RIGHET
OF ELECTION TO TAKE UNDER WILL.-Proceedings brought by the
executors of the last will and testament of John McGlone, deceased,
against the executors of the last will and testament of Helena Day
McGlone, deceased, for determination of her right to elect under § 18
of the Decedent Estate Law to take against the provisions of the last
will and testament of said John McGlone. It is contended that an un-
acknowledged written instrument by which Helena McGlone volunta-
rily and irrevocably renounced all rights which she might subsequently
be entitled to in any estate her husband-to-be, John McGlone, might
realize, is a contract and a property right which was impaired by the
provisions of § 18 of the Decedent Estate Law.' The federal question
upon appeal is whether § 18 of the Decedent Estate Law works an im-
pairment of the obligation of contract or a deprivation of property
without due process.2 The waiver was executed in London, England,
but the parties removed to New York where, at the time, a wife had
dower rights in her husband's real property. Later, the husband exe-
cuted a will, reciting the waiver but leaving his wife two thousand dol-
lars as a token of affection. New York Decedent Estate Law § 18 be-
came effective September 1, 1930, and on July 6, 1934, the husband
executed a codicil which, though it did not disturb the provisions of the
will, had the effect of bringing the entire will within the provisions of
the new law. The wife sought to exercise her right of election. Appeal
from a decree of the Surrogate's Court, Kings County, State of New
York, in favor of the defendant. Held, affirmed. Irving Trust Com-
pany v. Chase L. Day, 314 U. S. 556 (1942).
The dead hand rules succession only by sufferance. The legis-
lature of a state has the right to limit, condition or abolish the power
of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisprudence.3
Expectations of succession to the property of a living person do not
vest until the death of that person. A living person can have no
heirs.4 Before the death of the ancestor an expectant heir or dis-
' N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAw § 18 gave right of election to surviving spouse to
take under the will, or the difference between such aggregate and the amount of
the intestate share. It permitted waiver but to be effective it was required to
be by an instrument subscribed and duly acknowledged.
2 U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10, "No state shall pass any law impairing the
obligation of contracts .. ."; U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1, "... . nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."
3 Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931); Dolbeer's
Estate, 226 N. Y. 623, 123 N. E. 381 (1919); In re Germaine, 244 App. Div.
374, 280 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1935); In re Killough's Estate, 148 Misc. 73, 265
N. Y. Supp. 301 (1933).
4 Morsman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A.
8th), 113 A. L. R. 44f (1937).
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tributee has as such no interest, estate or rights in the property which
he may subsequently inherit.5 The husband made a voluntary legacy
to his wife, despite her waiver. If the obligation of the waiver suf-
fered impairment it was only because he exercised further testamen-
tary privileges with a condition attached and thereby brought those
consequences unwittingly or intentionally upon himself or his estate. 6
The state could have given the right of election to a spouse regardless
of a waiver, or it could condition recognition upon acknowledgment as
a desirable safeguard. 7 In states in which the subject of descent and
distribution is covered by statute, it is generally declared that the
right to take by descent, or inherit, is wholly the creature of, and
regulated by, statute." The right has been granted by law out of con-
sideration of public policy.9 The right to take property by descent
has been held or declared to be a mere creature of the law and not a
natural right.10
E.F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STERILIZATION.-X was imprisoned at
the Oklahoma State Penitentiary for his participation in an armed
robbery. He had once before been sentenced for such a crime and
had also been convicted for the theft of chickens. These crimes, all
being felonies, the Attorney General of the state, acting under the
provisions of the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act,' passed subse-
quent to the commission of the third conviction, brought proceedings
to obtain a judgment to render the felon sterile. Section 195 2 spe-
cifically exempts embezzlers although embezzlement has been defined
as a felony by statute in Oklahoma." Though the petitioner was
5 Newman v. Dore, 250 App. Div. 708, 294 N. Y. Supp. 499, aff'd, 275
N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 112 A. L. R. 643 (1937).
6 Compare with Restatement of Law of Contracts § 45, "A duty under a
unilateral or independent contractual obligation is discharged by a manifestation
by the obligee to the obligor at or before the time when performance is due of
unwillingness to receive the performance when due or of assent to its omission,
if the manifestation is not withdrawn before the expiration of a reasonable time
after performance becomes due."
7 See supra note 1.
8 Jones v. Jones, 234 U. S. 615, 34 Sup. Ct 937 (1914).
9 Stone v. Elliott, 182 Ind. 454, 101 N. E. 309 (1913).
10 Magoun v. Illinois Trust etc. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct. 594(1898) ; Dawson v. Godfrey, 4 Cranch 321, 2 L. ed. 634 (U. S. 1808).
1 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 171 et seq.; L. 1935, pp. 94 et seq (A habitual
criminal is a person who having been convicted two or more times for crimes
amounting to felonies . . . is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Okla-
homa).
2 Ibid.
a OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1704.
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